Yesterday I went to a lecture for the first time since Michaelmas Term of Second Year – and I was pleasantly surprised to find that it was really good. The subject was Plato’s political thought, for the Political Thought: Plato to Rousseau politics paper. In fact it was so good, it got me thinking, because Elizabeth Frazer’s (the lecturer) interpretation of Plato seemed to me wrong. So I wrote decided to write down what I think. Enjoy.
Plato’s Republic: A Vision of Harmony?
It is important to make clear at the outset the thesis I propose vis-à-vis that which I reject. This is best achieved by stating that I take Plato’s vision of an ideal polis as positing harmony to be both essential and indispensable. Without harmony, the ideal polis would not – could not – be ideal. This must be carefully delineated from a different thesis: that the outcome of Plato’s vision, if it were to be put into practice, would be a polis rooted in and defined by tension, as opposed to harmony. I follow Bernard Williams in thinking that the latter thesis is true – yet I wish simultaneously to advocate the truth of former. The thesis I reject, therefore, is that Plato’s vision is of an ideal polis built upon tension.
To establish the above I wish to contest five readings of passages from The Republic employed in today’s lecture. In doing this I attempt to establish the claim that Plato’s vision was of harmony, not of tension. I will conclude by offering considerations regarding the analogy of the cave, which appears to cause trouble for my reading.
Firstly, the ‘Noble Lie’. It is not clear that the Guardians themselves – at least, from the second generation onwards – are aware that they are perpetuating a lie. Plato leaves it ambiguous as to whether any but the founders of the city must know the truth. It is worth noting Plato’s particularly shocking stipulation that to found the ideal polis, all persons over the age of 10 will be (rather ominously) ‘taken away’. The ideal polis starts with as blank a slate as possible. Why does this matter? If all citizens, regardless of which class they belong to, believe that the social-economic status they find themselves confined to is not only just, but given by divine command – and further, that if violated will lead to the dissolution of the polis – they are far more likely to accept their social roles without question. If one class must constantly lie to the others, and consequently be on their guard against the possibility of rebellion, this certainly looks like a recipe for tension. Yet if Plato is attempting to construct an ideal polis, the first option looks far more desirable – and that is the option of harmony, not tension. This would explain the possibility of Guardians themselves not knowing that they are perpetuating a lie.
Secondly, the claim that the Guardian class must constantly (through the use of a Noble Lie?) justify to the lower class(es) their “relative poverty”. I strenuously contest this claim. Firstly, it seems to me textually unsupported, albeit indirectly. For Glaucon and Plato discuss the problem of the Guardians receiving rather a rough deal. They live in a property-less commune, and spend their whole lives working for the other classes; they do not even want to engage in politics, for this is a nasty business and they would rather spend their time philosophising. But as was pointed out in the lecture, Plato is icily clear that the Guardians do not live for their own comfort, but for that of the polis as a whole. The question then becomes “poverty relative to who?” I see no textual evidence that the Auxiliaries and the Producers will suffer significant material discrepancies relative to each other – if anything it would seem a reasonable inference that as the Guardian class grows out of the Auxiliary, the life of Auxiliaries – soldiers – will more closely resemble the material situation of the Guardians. It therefore looks as though the Producers are the most materially well-off class in the polis. This seems strengthened by the straightforward inference that a polis with the best system of government will be that which prospers the most, and in which the citizens are most well-off. Further, it is worth recalling Plato’s ascetism towards material well-being. Not only do the Guardians shun property and wealth, but a key tenet of The Republic is that material wealth is fleeting and of little ultimate value. The character of Polemarchus is a case in point: here is a man who’s immigrant father, Cephalus, has done well and will bequeath Polemarchus with great wealth. Neither men are particularly concerned with philosophical questions of justice. More fool them: as any contemporary Athenian would know, the Thirty would strip Polemarchus of his wealth and execute him. Material wealth can always be taken away, justice in the soul is forever; hence the Just Man is 729 times happier than the unjust. This implies that Plato is quite deliberately leaving material wealth to the Producers. They’re unphilosophical nature will be quite content with the trappings of materialism; and if they are content, they will carry out their functions willingly. This implies harmony, not tension.
I take completely the point made after the lecture that there is no evidence that Plato is in anyway egalitarian. With this I agree: he does not see all men as equal at all – the Guardians are intrinsically more fulfilled, more highly flourishing human beings than the Producers. But this inequality of soul does not translate into material inequality in the sense of material scarcity for the productive classes. If anything, the opposite: let the lower humans indulge in the futile trappings of material pleasure while the more complete men benefit from the ascetism of material rejection. But this material set-up will make the Producers far less likely to reject the wisdom of the Guardians: harmony not tension, is again the vision.
Thirdly, a remark on the fact that the Philosopher-Guardians’ commune-camp will exist outside the city walls. While I do not deny that there is almost certainly metaphorical import in this stipulation, it is worth remembering a practical consideration. Although Plato suggests starting anew by expelling everyone over the age of 10, he never proposes that an ideal polis must necessarily built physically from scratch. For sure, geography will determine a polis’ capabilities, but if a good existing site can be found (Athens surely being a prime contender) then there is no need to start (physically) anew. Yet if the Guardians are to live in property-less commune, they will have to live in camps outside of the city, simply due to physical requirement. Aside from that, I am suspicious as regards the significance of the removed status of the camp. For Plato justice in the city is like that in the soul. In the soul, the rational part is separate from the desiring and wishing parts, and so it makes sense in the city to separate them physically. It doesn’t follow from this that tension is inevitable; that the removed Guardians will travel into the polis to impose their judgement upon the other classes (but especially the desiring Producers); it could just be that separate parts function most harmoniously (and perhaps even at all) only when separated out.
Fourthly, a quick aside regarding the analogy of The Ship. As I mentioned, the expertise used to guide a ship safely is phronesis not nous, so there is a significant (and I think problematic) disanalogy between Platonic statesmanship and ship-sailing. For our purposes however, what is important to note is that a ship is far easier to sail if the old senile captain (i.e. the polity) wants to follow the advice of the expert navigator. Harmony between navigator and captain will be far more desirable that tension, especially during storms. Further, note that those who cause tension on the ship are the sophists and politicians, those seeking to usurp power whilst lacking expertise. As these people are expelled from the ideal polis, we need not worry about any tension they may bring to bear.
Fifthly, and I think most importantly, Plato explicitly states that justice – be it in the soul or in the city – arises when all parts fulfil their functions willingly. This to me sounds like a paradigm statement that the ideal polis is based on an essential harmony. For the Producers must willingly fulfil their functions, and they cannot be acting willingly if the only reason they fulfil their functions is because the Guardians force them to. This, of course, is where Williams makes trouble for Plato by showing that the harmony Plato envisages in the soul between reason, spirit and desire, when translated up to the level of the city, would certainly result in oppression of one class by another. But Williams’ point is also that Plato didn’t see this upshot, and that this was a (potentially fatal) failure on his behalf. If Williams is right – and I think that he is – this implies that Plato’s vision was one of harmony, even if the outcomes of his vision would in fact have been tension.
This reading is substantiated by recalling that Plato omits any discussion as to the detail of laws in The Republic. This makes sense if we posit harmony as his vision: a city (or a soul) functioning in harmony will not require (many) laws in order for it to function, so there will be no need for detailed discussion of what the laws should be. A city based on tension between classes, on the other hand, will find laws an indispensable tool for the maintenance of order.
Finally, and as promised, a consideration regarding the analogy of the Cave. The Cave is not like the Ship, because on the Ship the trouble-makers who breed tension are the politicians and sophists who would not be tolerated within the ideal polis. In the Cave, however, it is the ordinary people who laugh at and reject the philosopher-cum-adventurer, who has ventured out into the daylight brining back knowledge learned from the Form of the Good. As those chained in the cave, staring at the wall, could never comprehend the message of the philosopher, will it not be required that the philosopher coerce such (fundamentally and irreversibly) ignorant people? Will the Guardians’ task not be to force what is good upon the ignorant masses? Is tension not the inevitable state of affairs? The only way I can see of avoiding this conclusion – interestingly and I think highly importantly – is the use of the Noble Lie. For if the cave-dwellers can be inculcated into believing the Noble Lie, they will cease to resist the teachings of the Philosopher. They will want to be directed and led, they will no longer laugh, they will no longer resist. Their wills will be in accord with what the Guardians prescribe. What is this but harmony? Of course, Plato is out of the frying pan and into the fire: an account that posits one group’s being qualified to rule on account of access to metaphysical truth sits uneasily if it rests upon a foundational lie. But I am not here concerned to defend Plato’s vision, only to make the case as to what his vision is: harmony.
